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Internet, Public Space and Contention in Cuba
Bridging Asymmetries of Access to Public Space through Transnational 
Dynamics of Contention
Marie Laure Geoffray
Abstract
This paper explores the Cuban case to understand how contentious voices have 
managed to bridge asymmetries of access to public space thanks to their critical use 
of new information and communication technologies (NICTs) Internet. I argue that we 
need to look at how contentious uses of NICTs have reinforced existing processes 
on the island, while creating new channels of expression and linkage. The paper 
shows that the transnational dynamics of linkage put into place by a lively web of 
émigrés, Cuban activists and intellectuals as well as foreign journalists and scholars 
have allowed for the convergence of contentious micro arenas which already existed 
but were formerly segmented. This process of convergence has in turn allowed for 
the emergence of a more intricate public space and for the creation of a somewhat 
autonomous contentious space. Although this evolution of the Cuban regime is positive 
as far as freedom of speech, it is clear that new inequalities in access to voice emerge: 
the protagonists of those new social spaces are limited to specific social categories, 
namely the urban, young and highly educated.
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1. Introduction
The joke that circulated in January 2011 in Tunisia, “Why do the young Tunisians 
demonstrate in the streets, whereas they could do just the same on Facebook?” 
(Béchir Ayari 2011: 56) tells us much about the established dichotomy between street 
mobilizations and online mobilizations. Many analysts of Cuban politics and society 
tend to think that way when they consider the fast growing community of contentious 
bloggers in Cuba to be the new “civil society”, which will finally be able to break 
down the socialist regime. This perspective is flawed in two ways: it follows a logic of 
technological determinism (see Arsène’s literature review, 2011) and it simply restates 
the common illusion that the demise of authoritarian regimes is brought about by social 
actors seen as heroes (see Dobry’s criticism 2000). My perspective intends, on the 
contrary, to de-exceptionalize the way we consider protest and contentious uses of 
new information communication technologies (NICTs) in non-pluralistic contexts, by 
studying them together with practices of offline contention. 
It is also striking to observe the dichotomous nature of studies about the uses of NICTs 
in authoritarian regimes: either very optimistic or very pessimistic. Optimists rather 
emphasize the democratizing aspect of those uses (Shapiro 1999; Rahimi 2003; Davis 
2008), the way they allow to subvert the government’s social control (Simon et al. 2002), 
to put an end to the state monopoly on information (Damm and Thomas 2006), and to 
organize without organizations while documenting the state’s repression (Shirky 2008). 
They overlook the new asymmetries that access to NICTs creates between (generally) 
young urban professionals and poor and rural uneducated citizens. Pessimists rather 
stress the abilities of authoritarian regimes to use NICTs for economic development 
(Kalathil and Boas 2001, 2003) and to control and repress (Hughes 2002; Deibert 2003; 
Morozov 2011) while the emerging virtual spaces actually seem to be fragmented and 
not so visible (Flichy 2008; Lonkila 2008; Arsène 2010). In fact, very few studies try 
to understand systematically how contentious uses of NICTs do change things inside 
authoritarian regimes, without always leading to regime change (notably because few 
people do have access). Some researchers have shown how critical uses of NICTs do 
impact authoritarian rule in different ways: some issues can become public (Tai 2006; 
Thireau and Linshan 2005), certain questions can become politicized (Arsène 2011), 
and some governments can lose part of their international legitimacy (O’Leary 2000, 
Chowdhury 2008). But these questions remain understudied.
This paper focuses on the Cuban case study, in order to try and understand how 
contention, including contentious uses of NICTs impact the Cuban authoritarian regime, 
especially after the semi liberalization of access to new NICTs in 2008. I want to argue 
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here that contentious uses of NICTs do matter in Cuba because they have reinforced 
existing processes, while creating new channels of expression and linkage, especially 
with specific social segments of the politicized diaspora. The paper deals with the 
emergence of a more intricate contentious space in Cuba thanks to the constitution of a 
transnational Cuban virtual space. I will show how the transnational dynamics of linkage 
established by a lively web of émigré and exile Cuban citizens, groups of contentious 
activists and individual bloggers on the island and foreign experts, journalists and 
scholars has contributed to the creation of a contentious space (Mathieu 2007a) with 
characteristics of both “catness” (strong group cohesion) and “netness” (interpersonal 
and inter-network communication) (Tilly 1978) in Cuba. In that case, asymmetries 
between actors are not linked to differences as far as cultural capital (Bourdieu 1980) 
since most protagonists of the virtual space are well educated, but rather to their 
material and relational resources (Mathieu 2007b). My aim is to understand:
(1) in which way these new social actors impact the differing logics of multiple and 
fragmented arenas of social and political protest that already exist in Cuba; 
(2) what the reconfiguration of those arenas (notably through their transnationalization) 
tells us about changes within the regime.
Those changes testify to the growing space for criticism in Cuba, but at the same time 
inequalities keep widening between those who have access to NICTs, and thus to the 
Cuban public arena, and those who do not.
The analyses presented in this article are based on data collected during six research 
trips to Havana (between May 2006 and November 2011) and one research trip to 
Barcelona and Madrid (summer 2011). The last two research trips were conducted 
during my research stay at desiguALdades.net where I was part of Research Dimension 
II (Socio-political Inequalities). The paper is a longer draft of my presentation at LASA 
2012, in San Francisco, which I attended as a desiguALdades.net researcher. 
I have mainly worked with an ethnographic research method, combining long term 
observations in the field, more than one hundred semi directed interviews with members 
of contentious collectives, bloggers in Havana and in Spain, local authorities in Havana 
and cultural authorities in Havana, and the analysis of documents (images, flyers, texts 
to inform about activities and texts to present the protagonists’ work), blog posts and 
online discussions on forums.
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2. Was There a Public Sphere in Cuba Before the Internet?
If we use Nancy Fraser’s definition of the public sphere (2007) as “the communicative 
generation of public opinion” with normative legitimacy (social inclusiveness) and 
political efficacy (making governments accountable), then there was no public sphere 
in Cuba before the internet. Sujatha Fernandes (2006) challenged this assumption 
in her research about the art worlds in Cuba and coined the notion of “artistic public 
spheres”. She contended that artists and art works do create a space for people to 
voice criticisms, which are later (partly) incorporated into official discourse. The art 
worlds are here presented as intermediaries between the population and the state. 
Although such an interpretation seems quite intriguing because it shows that there is 
a certain plasticity in the way Cuban leaders wield power, it is also partly questionable 
because it overstresses artists’ intentions to “reconcile” old ideals and new realities 
and underestimates their professional self-interest and constraints, while at the same 
time overlooking the existence of other kinds of spaces for debate.
In Cuba, before access to the internet was semi-liberalized, there were multiple, 
small, closed spaces. Although they manage to attract varied audiences, they are 
therefore not public in the sense of Violaine Roussel (2009): visible and accessible for 
large audiences. How then should we understand those micro spaces where people 
met and interacted to voice concerns, discuss issues and formulate claims without 
developing a wide audience? The notion of “arenas” seems here better suited than 
that of public sphere because it points to the multiple and fragmented spaces of debate 
and discussion (Costa and Avritzer 2009), which all share certain characteristics: a 
dispute about public goods, visibility or publicization of that dispute and a performative 
dimension, that is the staging of the dispute in front of (albeit very limited) publics 
(Cefaï 2002).
2.1. A Tentative Map of Existing Arenas
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 prompted the emergence of hundreds of micro circles 
of social and political debate in Cuba. Whereas most discussions had until then taken 
place behind closed doors, often in the private sphere, they suddenly took place in the 
street and in parks, at university and in research centers, among peers at work and 
during official neighborhood assemblies, i.e. they staged disputes and became visible 
for some social circles. But most of those spaces did not survive the sudden crush, 
decided by the government in 1995, on all attempts at creating a more inclusive and 
freer sphere of debate and self-expression. As a result, when I started my doctoral 
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work, in the mid-2000s, I could only map three micro arenas of debate inside Cuba.1 
Outside of Cuba, though not much larger, I localized a diaspora arena.2 I will here 
describe them in order to present a tentative map of the then existing arenas.
The first one can be called the dissident arena. It was composed of groups and 
individuals who wished to overthrow the Cuban government, called themselves 
“political dissidents” and were either party activists (Marta Beatríz Roque), human rights 
activists (Elizardo Sánchez) or specific project leaders (such as Oswaldo Paya with 
the Varela project), generally active since the mid-1980s. Those dissidents converged 
around shared beliefs and ideas: they clearly rejected the revolutionary utopia, they 
denounced the political order as authoritarian (if not totalitarian), and their strategy was 
to appeal to embassies and get international media coverage in order to gain foreign 
support for their cause (very much like the dissidents of the ex-communist block). 
This strategy worked as far as generating international publics. Oswaldo Paya and the 
Ladies in White obtained the Sakharov prize of the European Parliament in 2002 and 
2007, which gave their respective fights even more prominence in the international 
media and thus generated more international publics (support committees etc.). 
But their cause remained almost invisible within Cuba, because their internal fights 
together with their total lack of local publics (due to their radical marginalization from 
the rest of the population3) isolated them and contributes to create a microcosm of 
very few individuals who met behind closed doors. The dissident arena was therefore 
fragmented into delimited “micro spaces”, characterized by their boundedness, local 
invisibility and illegitimacy (Freedom House 2008) despite the staging of their protest 
in front of international publics.
A second arena is constituted of the semi-public debates organized inside state 
institutions like research centers, foundations with legal status (allowed to receive 
foreign funds), Cuban NGOs and a few critical reviews or magazines like Temas 
(created by Rafael Hernández) and Criterio (created by Desiderio Navarro). This 
1 I must state here that I spent most of my research trips in Havana, therefore I am overlooking existing 
spaces elsewhere. At the same time, those spaces, when they exist, are often short lived because of 
lack of resources and strong pressure, whereas Havana is a place where it is easier to have access 
to resources and escape pressure.
2 I do not take into account here the Cuban-American diaspora’s many arenas of debate in the United 
States, because they take place in an entirely different political, economic, and cultural environment. 
Since my focus is on how participants in Cuba can create new spaces despite the changing set 
of obstacles and opportunities within a rather closed system, non-U.S. diaspora groups are more 
relevant, since they are not part of highly professionalized U.S.-based fundraising and lobbying 
networks. 
3 Once an individual declares himself as a dissident, he loses his job, is constantly watched over by the 
state security, his neighbors are most likely to be part of the state apparatus (for purposes of close 
observation), and he is constantly threatened. Peers, family and friends of dissidents thus step back 
due to the concern that to maintain social relations with dissidents would harm them.
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arena has a broader membership than the artists-only sphere identified by Fernandes 
(2006). Despite the visible heterogeneity of those entities, they actually share the 
same local publics: critical intellectuals, writers, artists, journalists and professors, in 
other words, parts of the intellectual and cultural Havana milieu with a commitment 
towards the revolutionary utopia but with the will to reform its implementation in Cuba. 
This intermediate position and the difficulty to strike a balance between too little and 
too much criticism have led the participants of that arena to strive to remain within 
acceptable boundaries of criticism, out of fear that crossing those imprecise, fluctuating 
boundaries would backfire and put an end to the existence of those more open and 
more critical spaces for debate. To protect that arena, its main protagonists therefore 
try to control its boundaries themselves through restrained information politics (to limit 
access), a very controlled discourse towards foreigners and foreign media and partial 
collaboration with the state (they for instance let state security officials prohibit entrance 
to certain people during certain events). The arena of critical intellectuals is therefore 
best characterized as a micro sphere of limited exchanges between peers, who are 
critical of (some aspects of) the regime without challenging it as such and who stage 
their disputes only in front of chosen publics.
 
The third arena emerged at the end of the 1990s. It was the product of the convergence 
of contentious collectives of self-educated artists (rappers, performers and visual 
artists, with no or very low access to state venues and resources), art managers and 
somewhat marginalized intellectuals (with no regular university employment). These 
are the actors overlooked in previous scholarship since their status is ambiguous. 
Created from below, at the local level, often within marginalized neighborhoods, this 
arena is the most contentious one as far as the radicalism of expressed criticism (against 
censorship, racism, social inequalities and in favor of more grassroots autonomy) and 
practices of direct action often aimed at finding solutions for the concrete problems 
of daily life. Although it is composed of very heterogeneous spaces and participants, 
the distinct collectives which sustain this contentious arena often collaborate to create 
specific workshops, mini congresses and festivals, which take place either in the street 
or in local cultural institutions. These events are well known and well attended by 
residents of their neighborhoods where the collectives negotiate space to work or 
to organize their activities. This arena is therefore the most publicized and inclusive 
one, though only at a local level. Moreover, the “critical but revolutionary” ethos of its 
protagonists led them to negotiate with authorities, so as to use official venues for 
debates and activities, which in turn contributed to the moderation of the most critical 
claims of the arena.
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Apart from those three main Cuban arenas, there existed a diaspora arena outside 
of Cuba, which connected (1) parts of the cultural milieu in Cuba and in the diaspora 
and (2) politically active members of the Cuban diaspora whatever their geographical 
location. The main space of convergence was organized around literary journal 
Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, created by exiled Cuban writer Jesús Díaz in Spain. 
From its creation in 1992 until its last issue in 2009, this journal published both writers 
and intellectuals from Cuba and from the Cuban diaspora and thus sustained polemical 
debates about both the arts and politics. Those polemics took place inside the journal 
and outside of it since the very possibility of the existence of such an endeavor was 
addressed as a threat by both the politically radicalized exile milieu in Miami as well as 
the Cuban official press and authorities, who both strove to maintain separate spheres 
of influence. In addition to the journal, online exchanges in blogs and forums started 
between exile and émigré internet users. But most virtual spaces were isolated spaces, 
which interacted little with other spaces and more often than not did not seek contact 
with Cubans or Cuban information providers from Cuba. The one exception to this 
rule was Encuentro en la Red, the online offspring of Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, 
which did attempt to collect alternative information from Cuba – though most of the 
news still came from news agencies – by collaborating with dissidents. The Encuentro 
team also strove to circulate information in Cuba by sending a biweekly newsletter to 
an email list. For that purpose, they built and updated regularly a database of several 
thousand Cuban email addresses (in .cu) in the late 2000s.4 That is why Encuentro 
en la Red worked as a focal point until the late 2000s: it was the only place where 
Cubans could get information made by Cubans for Cubans, both on the island and in 
the diaspora. Nevertheless, since they only loosely interacted with one another, this 
diaspora arena is best characterized as an ensemble of juxtaposed and fragmented 
spaces. 
 
Despite many differences these arenas nevertheless share three characteristics as 
discussed above: their reduced size (limited publics), their heteronomy – despite 
their claim for autonomy – vis-à-vis the Cuban state, and their poor connectivity and 
interactivity. In this way, both their “catness” (strong cohesion) and their “netness” 
(interpersonal communication) (Tilly 1978) can be said to have remained weak. That 
is why it is more relevant to consider those spaces as micro arenas or partial arenas. 
Although they do stage a dispute about public goods, this dispute is constrained in terms 
of content, unequal in terms of means, and it has little visibility and little performativity. 
4 Interviews with Manuel Desdin (technical support for Encuentro en la Red until 2009 and now its 
main coordinator), with Pablo Díaz (ex chief editor of Encuentro en la Red and now director of Diario 
de Cuba) and with Antonio José Ponte (co-director of journal Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana until 
its end and now co-director of news platform Diario de Cuba) in June and July 2011.
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2.2. Loose Connections and Logics of Competition 
It would be empirically untrue to state that those four micro arenas were parallel arenas 
with no interconnection whatsoever, but it is relatively true to present the dissident 
arena (despite some contacts with both transnational arenas) as quite isolated within 
Cuba, and the diaspora arena as quite segmented from Cuba, since there was little 
interactive contact with publics on the island until the liberalization of NICTs in 2008 
(despite the fact that Encuentro en la Red – the journal’s online information platform 
– sent regular information to people in Cuba through email lists). At the same time, 
despite those strong constraints, there did exist a complex game of partial connection 
and disconnection between them, which is to be understood by looking at certain 
specific constraints and logics concerning (1) access to and circulation of information 
and (2) the question of balance between contention and conformity. 
When I was conducting research in Cuba, I realized that I often provided information 
to the people I was working with. I knew more about what was happening where, 
who was taking part in such and such endeavor and about what the people who were 
involved in some collective project thought of other people in other projects. To put it in 
a nutshell, I had a wider and more complete perspective on the existing micro arenas 
of debate and alternative social practices than most people who were actually involved 
in some of those spaces. It seems partly self-explanatory since I had an interest for all 
kinds of “alternative projects” as Cubans themselves called them, whereas those who 
were involved were generally busy implementing their projects. But what struck me 
was that the contingency of the connections between people and between projects, 
which contradicted the expressed desire to work in a more collective way and to impact 
more publics.
To give a few examples: some rappers would not go the annual rap festival because 
they had not been invited personally by their fellow rappers and did not know for sure 
where and when concerts were taking place, intellectuals would not show up at a 
workshop to which they had been invited because the person who was supposed to 
contact them was not reachable and nobody knew for sure what had happened, rumors 
circulated constantly about no shows (if the absentees had preferred to go somewhere 
else, for instance to meet with foreigners for better deals?), etc. Those few examples 
show that contingency prevailed and that personal contacts were crucial. People’s 
perceptions mainly depended on tales told by intermediaries (on whom they relied for 
information) between social circles and arenas, rather than on available information 
given either by public sources (media) or by the concerned people themselves. I believe 
it is one of the reasons why the projects of political dissidents were always dismissed 
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as “counter revolutionary” (as in the official discourse) rather than discussed by critical 
individuals and other projects. There was almost no way for people to know who the 
dissidents were and what they actually stood for. This explains why it was easier for 
many contentious collectives to build a negative image of dissident groups: it was safe 
to do so, and it was part of their overall strategy to remain within more or less tolerated 
boundaries.
To sum it up, interpersonal relations were used to cope with the lack of access to a 
more visible and central source of information, due to the lack of alternative media 
channels to circulate propositions and concerns and to organize meetings and events. 
Before the partial liberalization of access to NICTs in Cuba in 2008, there was a dire 
lack of communication facilities (few people had a telephone line and even fewer had 
an email account and those who did, would not dare use it for contentious purposes). 
This situation explains partly why connections between micro arenas were always 
precarious and contingent, depending on individual agents’ goodwill and availability 
rather than on visible and established routes of contact. This also meant that the costs 
of entrance in a collective project were high because it was only possible though direct 
contact with already involved actors. 
The second constraint had to do with people’s perception of the possible and fear of 
repression. One example is particularly telling as far as the game played by many 
protagonists of the micro arenas between conformity and contention. Since the 
1990s, Cuban artists and intellectuals had become more fashionable abroad because 
Cuba was undergoing reforms and because some of them had started to express 
certain kinds of criticism towards their political regime. This foreign interest allowed 
those critical voices to travel and present their works abroad, and thus to earn both 
an international professional recognition and some extra money for themselves and 
their projects. At the same time, they believed too much criticism could be harmful for 
their career inside Cuba, where they lived. State security officials did indeed intervene 
often in order to curb those whom they thought were crossing the line (being overly 
critical in front of the foreign media or in foreign academic settings, etc.). Their rhetoric 
was based on the “enemy” who attempted to “manipulate” well-meaning revolutionary 
Cubans. They advised people to stay away from activists who were not clearly in 
favor of the revolutionary government. But the right balance was hard to strike: too 
much contact even with Cubans abroad could be harmful, as poet and journalist Raúl 
Rivero’s imprisonment in 2003 demonstrated,5 but too little criticism could lead them 
to be stigmatized abroad as “officialists” and to lose part of their reputation and maybe 
5 One of the main charges against him when he was jailed in 2003 was the fact that he had regularly 
contributed to Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana and Encuentro en la Red. See Eliseo Alberto (2003): 
“En defensa de Raúl Rivero”, in: El País, April 20, at: http://bit.ly/WaSIK5 (last access: 13/03/2013).
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funds from foreign cooperation agencies or invitation from foreign universities, etc. 
There were different possibilities to appease both sides: Be more critical abroad than 
in Cuba, publish in polemical Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana but only about art theory 
or political philosophy, speak in metaphors and then claim to have been misunderstood 
if questioned, and strive not to be associated with people who appeared to be more 
critical than oneself. On the whole, the best strategy was to seem not to be clearly 
positioned, and thus hard to blame. 
There were also elaborate games of connection and disconnection within Cuba. The 
interplay between protagonists of the contentious and critical arenas is here quite 
telling. Participants in the contentious arena sometimes participated in the critical 
arena, to get information, bring some input, and become better known by people who 
enjoyed a higher degree of legitimacy within the cultural Havana milieu. They invited 
some of those legitimate artists or intellectuals to specific events they organized, in 
order to benefit from their “protection” against state officials’ censorship. But they also 
criticized the “soft” positions of the established intellectuals and artists, particularly 
their inability to appeal to larger publics (the youth and the lower classes). Despite this 
apparent antagonism, the more legitimate artists and intellectuals interacted with the 
contentious arena, because they were interested in its emergent ways of formulating 
criticism and in its younger publics, and also because it gave them the reputation to be 
able to “deal” with the youth, which was seen by state officials as something positive. 
But they also handled differently those whom they considered as “mature” and those 
whom they singled out as “immature” or “disrespectful” of certain norms and rules 
of “good behavior” in order to protect their own legitimacy and sphere of influence 
(which needed to be bounded in order to be tolerated). The latter were not invited 
to official events, for instance, and resented those labels. But they often were able 
to access other resources like foreign counterparts or foreign cooperation agencies, 
which sometimes directly financed some of the “disrespectful” projects or gave them 
support in one way or another, thus helping them to get back into the game and to be 
taken into account by “legitimate” participants. Transnational resources can, in that 
case, compensate local inequalities.
What is here striking is the precariousness of the horizontal dynamics of contact and 
exchange, and the considerable weight of vertical logics of control over alternative 
or semi-autonomous collective projects. Moreover, the absence of focal points like 
national media (which seldom wrote about polemical issues at that time) and of 
mobilizations (still prohibited) prevented the constitution of a “public opinion” that could 
have counterbalanced the power of state authorities. And finally, there were no large 
incentives for protagonists of the different micro arenas to push boundaries further, 
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because they had more or less managed to strike a balance between their need to 
protest and the necessity to remain within certain limits in order for their protest to be 
tolerated and for their career not to be too adversely affected (most protagonists are 
either Havana-based artists or intellectuals), although it meant – except for political 
dissidents – that their voice had become tolerated because it was perceived by the 
authorities as not being harmful enough. Those diverse logics and dynamics explain 
why there was no public sphere – inclusive enough and efficient enough to fit Fraser’s 
(2007) definition – in Cuba before the internet. The different arenas of debate had 
not managed to overcome their micro dimension and had remained heterogeneous, 
limited and controlled by the Cuban authorities. 
3. From Micro Arenas to a Semi-Integrated Public Arena
How did those micro arenas, which were only loosely connected, subjected to logics 
of competition and overshadowed by the fear of and the actual repression from Cuban 
political authorities, converge into a transnational semi-integrated space of debate, 
discussion and deliberation, with agenda setters, focal points and shared references? 
I here contend that we need to study interactive dynamics between “real” spaces and 
virtual spaces in order to understand that process. The question is thus the following: 
what roles have access to and contentious uses of NITCs played in the enlargement 
of the boundaries of the arenas, related to their capacity and will to interact more 
intensely with other arenas, and with respect to the change in their perceptions of what 
is possible and doable within the Cuban authoritarian context? 
I find it useful to study heightened “moments” of conflict, rather than the entire range 
of possible interactions, in order to understand how those perceptions have evolved 
and led to more intense interaction and interactivity between the different arenas. My 
approach combines a social movements perspective (Oberschall 1973: 114 on high 
risk activism; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 43), an opportunity structures approach 
that focuses on people’s perceptions (Mathieu 2007a) a meaning-centered approach 
focused on people’s understanding of their own actions (Cefaï 2007), along with more 
specific hypotheses from the literature on political uses of NICTs (Cardon 2010; Cardon 
and Granjon 2010). Indeed, what matters here is to understand how visibility, which 
used to be seen as a threat, is now seen as an asset. 
To understand that process, I propose to look at specific moments of net activism 
(mobilizations and “coups” Dobry 2000), which have transformed existing but poorly 
developed interconnections into more durable dynamics of interactivity, both within 
Cuba and between Cuba and the Cuban diaspora since 2007. Those moments have 
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impacted people’s perceptions because they have clearly showed that there was more 
space for contention and that it was possible to voice concerns without being violently 
repressed and to win fights against the Cuban government. In turn, this increased 
visibility of contention led the Cuban government to respond by creating online spaces 
designed to defend the state ideology.
3.1. Shifting Norms: From Voicing Criticism to Collective Mobilization
In January and February 2007, the first virtual mobilization took place in Cuba. A handful 
of artists and intellectuals – known for their critical stance and their participation into or 
organization of critical debates – started exchanging emails after several TV programs 
broadcast interviews with three former officials who had been responsible for the 
implementation of intensive censorship and repression in the cultural sphere from 
1971-1976. After a few days, hundreds of emails started circulating, and intellectuals 
and artists in Cuba and abroad were exchanging messages on the same topic. Why 
would those censors be given publicity almost forty years after their deeds? Did that 
mean that the liberalization of cultural politics that had started in the early 1990s was 
over? And people debated how to counter a potential repressive turn. The scope of the 
debates, the different kinds of protagonists and the conflictive dynamics of that polemic 
– or “email war” as it was termed – led me to understand it as a first turning point in the 
enlargement and in the growing interactivity within arenas and between them.
First of all, the polemic did not take place in one specific arena, but in the virtual space 
of emails. It was triggered by three artists and intellectuals, who, even though they 
participated very unevenly in the critical arena, were known for their critical attitude. 
They wrote the first texts and circulated them by email. It is thus rather the ambiguous 
status of the space – chains of email addresses – where the polemic developed, 
which allows for a large and trans-arena participation. Indeed the use of that space 
was perceived as somewhat “safe” 6 since it did not really transgress the informal rule 
“bajo techo todo, en la calle nada” (under the roof everything, in the street nothing), 
according to which critics should be voiced inside state institutions and directly to 
the authorities in charge, and should not be voiced publicly, in the street for instance 
(Hoffmann 2011). At the same time, the structure of virtual communication was still 
problematic since email accounts could only be given by institutions, thus linked to their 
owner’s professional status. They were nevertheless allowed to circulate critics and 
6 One of the three initiators of the polemic, told me he was actually very afraid during the first days 
after the first emails were sent, because they had taken a totally unprecedented step and did not 
know how cultural and political authorities would react to that. But he had also calculated that the 
voicing of concerns by email could not be assimilated to demonstrating in the streets. D. Navarro was 
interviewed on September 8, 2008.
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claims in a space which was parallel to existing institutions, and in a horizontal way, i.e. 
among peers, and not directly to state authorities, which is exactly what authorities had 
always tried to prevent from happening. Despite this ambiguity, the horizontal way of 
debating and the possibility to join the polemic while under way allowed each individual 
to step in when he or she deemed it appropriate. This led to a progressive growth 
in the numbers of involved people, which finally transformed private communication 
between a few peers into a semi public debate within the cultural sphere (understood 
in a broad sense: art, academia, cultural reviews etc.), and it became more difficult for 
state authorities to repress the whole movement. The medium that actors appropriated 
to debate thus provided some of the conditions for the convergence and interaction of 
social actors, who were often already connected, though only partially, and in a loose 
and fragmented way. 
The second remarkable characteristic of this contentious moment is its deterritorialization. 
Territorial boundaries were transgressed by the active participation of émigré artists 
and intellectuals (like Duanel Díaz, Eliseo Alberto and José Prats Sariol) in the debate, 
thanks to the massive and multiple forwarding of emails, which also reached them. Their 
participation did not go unnoticed, however, and some members of the cultural sphere 
in Cuba strove to keep the debates exclusively on Cuban grounds (Ponte 2010: 100). 
The tangible freedom of tone with which most non-Cuban residents indeed intervened 
in the debate to formulate overt critics of revolutionary cultural politics led some to fear 
that discursive boundaries (the limits of what is tolerated/or rather seen as such) were 
being transgressed in such a way that their participation would be counterproductive.7 
And finally, the scope of the debates, spanning historical periods such as the 1960s 
and 1970s until the present, challenged the cultural sphere’s heteronomy vis-à-vis the 
political sphere because it questioned and attempted to rewrite the official history of 
revolutionary cultural politics. These historical discussions led to a collective questioning 
of individual responsibilities in upholding a system of censorship and repression 
(especially at the beginning of the revolutionary period but also in recent times). 
The fact that the Ministry of Culture finally managed to tone down the polemic, thanks 
to the organization of many bajo techo debates (one must be formally invited to attend, 
with names checked against an invitation list) was understood by some analysts as 
a failure for the first virtual mobilization in Cuba (Ponte 2010: 134). But beyond the 
dissolution of the polemic, the polemic has to be considered as a landmark of collective 
action under the Cuban authoritarian government, because of the (virtual) space where 
7 This idea is also shared by some exiles who say they remain “revolutionaries”. See Eliseo Alberto’s 
email about other exiles’ positions at: http://bit.ly/13TdzVt (last access 13/03/2013).
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it took place, its scope and the number of participants (and their localization). The tone 
of the debates and the arguments exchanged moreover clearly show that the “critical 
ethos” has become more valued than the “compliant ethos” (people who do not – at 
least never overtly – criticize the rules of the system, so as to benefit from it) among 
participants in the debate, and especially among legitimate members of the cultural 
sphere. Those who had collaborated with such a system (and even some who had 
remained silent while they could have bent the rules of the system) were stigmatized 
by those who suffered from it or criticized it and thus were marginalized or worse. 
Whereas protagonists of the critical arena had often felt as a tolerated minority, the 
polemic made it clear that there was a shift in norms and that their critical stances 
towards certain aspects of revolutionary politics were shared by many more. It is the 
high and interactive participation of many well-known and legitimate protagonists of 
the cultural sphere which made this shift in norms visible, whereas it was either not so 
accepted and/or not so visible before.
On top of it all, many new spaces of debate emerged both bajo techo and online, with 
the emergence of tens of bloggers in Cuba in the following years. Desiderio Navarro 
opened his cycle of encounters, which remains famous and well-attended up to today 
Yoani Sánchez, the most famous Cuban blogger, said clearly that she decided to open 
a blog, when she was excluded from most bajo techo debates organized after the 
virtual polemic. To put it in a nutshell, the contentious moment triggered by a few artists 
and intellectuals’ critical responses to what they interpreted as the sign of a repressive 
turn in cultural politics has in fact enlarged the critical arena in terms of claims and 
publics, intensified conflictive dynamics vis-à-vis the political authorities and allowed 
for the transnationalization of debates held in Cuba. Positions were moreover clarified 
and thus helped participants to recognize potential allies and opponents. 
Although those dynamics of intense connectivity and interactivity were limited in time 
(a few months) in actors (only well-connected people related to the cultural sphere) 
and in publicity, since the general – unconnected – public never learnt about the 
polemic,8 this virtual mobilization constituted a first step in the process of convergence 
between different micro arenas both in Cuba and abroad. First, the protagonists of the 
polemic set new norms as far as critical behavior vis-à-vis the government. Second, 
the legitimacy of exile participants was partly questioned but it was fully taken into 
account and commented upon by those who still lived in Cuba. And eventually, the 
8 The only clue official media provided for Cubans was a very short article in Granma (the Communist 
Party newspaper), published on January 18, 2007 “La política cultural de la Revolución es 
irreversible”, stating ambiguously that the revolutionary cultural politics will remain the same (open 
to creativity) while at the same time quoting a text by Fidel Castro, which is seen as the beginning of 
the censorship era of the 1960s and 1970s.
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first virtual mobilization was a first step in the transformation of critics formulated by 
individuals or small groups into more collective contentious practices. 
3.2. When Visibility Becomes an Asset
Visibility is a main component of the definition of “public”. A public arena is an arena 
which is visible for large social segments of a given society (Roussel 2009). But in 
Cuba, visibility had long been seen as a threat by those who tried to voice concerns or 
implement alternative social practices (see the bajo techo todo norm). Both the fate of 
the dissidents and state security agents’ special visits paid to specific protagonists were 
clear signs that proximity with foreign media, foreign embassies and foreign academia 
(and even with foreign leftist activists) was seen as a problem by high state officials. 
Although some defied that norm, most complied and focused on local, under the radar, 
activism, because invisibility seemed to guarantee continuity of action. This perception 
dramatically evolved after the unexpected success of the transnational campaign to 
free punk singer and musician Gorki Aguila. 
On 25 August 2008, Gorki was charged with the frightening crime of “social 
dangerousness”, defined in the Cuban law as “the specific proclivity of a person to 
commit crimes, as shown by his conduct, when in manifest contradiction with the 
norms of socialist morality”.9 With this law, any Cuban citizen can be arrested before 
he commits a crime, under assumptions that he could commit a crime. No one had 
ever been released after being accused with such charges, but Gorki walked free after 
five days, thanks to a massive and intense transnational campaign. 
Although Gorki enjoyed a degree of local fame because of his flowery contentious lyrics 
and attitude, he was almost completely unknown abroad before he was imprisoned for 
the first time (2003-2005) under manufactured charges of drug dealing. At the time, a 
few international organizations like Freemuse (support for repressed musicians) and 
Amnesty International had worked on his case but to no avail. In 2008, the charges were 
so blurred that Gorki’s friends and fellow band members interpreted them as a clear 
sign that state officials had decided to silence Gorki for good. It was their hopelessness 
which pushed them to go public and launch a campaign both in Cuba and abroad, by 
contacting all the people whom they thought could help, either because of their fame, 
influence or links to foreign media.10 Thanks to a few friends in Mexico and the United 
States, the story was quickly published in Cuban media in Florida, and Cuban bloggers 
9 Article 72 of the Cuban Penal Code (own translation).
10 See interview with Claudia Cadela by Tracey Eaton on his blog (Along the Malecon), at: 
http://bit.ly/13Te1TE (last access 13/03/2013).
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and artists in Spain and in the United States soon picked up the story and circulated 
it broadly, framing Gorki as the paradigmatic repressed artist under authoritarian rule. 
This framing of the case increased its publicity dramatically both within Cuban exile 
circles and more widely within the transnational artistic and intellectual milieu. The 
petition launched by Zoé Valdés and Ernesto Hernández Busto on the latter’s blog 
Penúltimos Días was indeed quickly signed by famous Cuban artists abroad and by 
big names in the musical sphere like Miguel Bosé and Alejandro Sanz (there were 
8-14,000 connections per day to Penúltimos Días  during the Gorki campaign). When 
Gorki was released on 30 August, after only five days in prison, and sentenced to pay 
a minor fine, his case had become so commented upon that even celebrities like Sean 
Penn and José Saramago were said to be ready to participate in the campaign.11
What is remarkable in Gorki’s case is that it led to the crystallization of a small network 
of bloggers in Cuba and abroad (Yoani Sánchez, Claudia Cadelo, Orlando Luis Pardo, 
Lia Villares, Ernesto Hernández Busto, Zoé Valdés, Jorge Ferrer, Enrique del Risco, 
etc.), who had collaborated on the circulation of news about the Gorki case. The case 
has wide implications beyond this particular musician: Gorki’s liberation catalyzed a 
shift in perceptions. Whereas people in Havana thought that there was not a single 
chance for Gorki to walk free after being charged with “social dangerousness”, the 
fact that he did, after obtaining such transnational visibility, led people to adjust their 
perceptions in many ways. First, Gorki’s liberation was interpreted both as a defeat for 
the government and as a sign that Cuban authorities were more flexible than before. 
Secondly, whereas contentious collectives had often shunned foreign attention, 
they started to look systematically for allies abroad because they now understood 
transnational relations as one way to be protected against potential state repression. 
And thirdly, whereas they had until then rather disregarded NICTs as a communication 
tool to inform others about their activities, they started to create blogs or websites in 
order to have visible platforms which could also attract foreign support, and to control 
their image by crafting a presentation of themselves which could counterbalance 
potential attacks by state officials (Geoffray 2012).
This second contentious moment was crucial to push critical voices inside Cuba to 
search for wider and more diverse publics. Whereas those critical protagonists often 
saw the meaning of taking the risk of protest as a way to be at peace with their own 
values and – for some of them – to try and change things at a very local level, they 
subsequently started to want to contribute to social and political change in Cuba in a 
much larger way. Common work on causes like Gorki’s freedom began to be seen as 
11 See Carlos Alberto Montaner’s post on Penúltimos Días: “La libertad de Gorki Aguila y de todos los 
Cubanos”, at: http://bit.ly/ZzTvAI (last access 13/03/2013).
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common ground even by people who were previously divided by differing ideological 
positions. Beyond the fact that the Gorki campaign led to dynamics of convergence 
between protagonists of different micro arenas, this mobilization should be considered 
as a turning point as far the configuration of a transnational Cuban public arena. It 
indeed created the shift in perceptions which was needed to have activists take more 
risks, be more visible and connect more with transnational networks of support for their 
cause.
3.3. The Configuration of a Transnational Cuban Public Arena
The “war of visibility” (Cardon and Granjon 2010) and the exchange of “coups” 
(Dobry 2000) are the two dynamics which characterize the process of configuration 
of the transnational Cuban public arena. The “war of visibility” is the result of the 
lack of gatekeepers on the internet, which allows subaltern social groups to express 
themselves more than earlier. But their influence in the virtual sphere is linked to their 
ability to become visible for large publics. In the Cuban context, this war was quite 
specific, since prominent actors are subaltern at home while dominant abroad: now, 
non-governmental online actors actually became visible faster than governmental 
actors thanks to foreign publics. The transnational dimension of NICTs is here a threat 
to authoritarian governments in small countries, since in many ways, audiences on the 
domestic internet are still dominated by central actors, just as in the traditional media 
(Hindman 2009). But in a small country like Cuba – unlike China – the state does not 
have the ability to counterbalance international mainstream media influence. That is 
why national and transnational asymmetries (or inequalities) between online actors, as 
far as incorporated, material and relational resources (Mathieu 2007b), are essential 
in the understanding of the exchange of “coups” and “contre-coups”, which gave its 
actual configuration to the transnational Cuban public arena.
The most paradigmatic example of transfer of relational resources between the politically-
active Cuban diaspora online and contentious Cubans in Cuba is the relationship 
between bloggers Yoani Sánchez and Ernesto Hernández Busto.12 Busto was one of 
the bloggers who decided to launch their blogs after Fidel Castro retired in 2006. His 
blog Penúltimos Días was and remains relevant and topical because it strives to get 
fresh, alternative and trustworthy information about daily life, problems and challenges 
in Cuba, “as seen by the Cuban people themselves”. That is why Busto was extremely 
active in mapping the emerging Cuban blogosphere in Cuba, and he frequently linked 
from some of the posts on his own blog to others, so as to give even more incentives 
to readers to go and discover those blogs by themselves. Busto did so out of curiosity 
12 Interviews with Ernesto Hernández Busto 17th, 18th, 21st of June 2011.
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about political change in Cuba and because he felt close to the emerging contentious 
voices on the island. A member of previous contentious experiments (Paideia13) Busto 
felt they had picked up his old fight about democratization of culture and politics and 
decided to give them as much visibility as he could. He especially promoted Yoani 
Sánchez’s writings, which he found particularly well written and well informed, by 
copying her posts (with her agreement) on his own blog. Penúltimos Días  (PD) thus 
worked as a focal point since its very beginnings (bloggers, activists, journalists as 
well as academics admitted that PD was a main source of information for them14), 
which facilitated the circulation of information, improved net activists’ knowledge of one 
another, and connected many virtual spaces together. He thus contributed crucially 
to enlarge the Cuban virtual arena abroad while connecting it with similar emerging 
blogger counterparts on the island. 
This early connection with Yoani Sánchez bore important consequences for the 
configuration of the transnational Cuban public arena. Thanks to her abilities, to her 
audacity and to her timing (she was the first non-anonymous critical Cuban voice online) 
which attracted an quickly growing readership in the Cuban diaspora and beyond, 
and promoted by Busto and other exile bloggers, Sánchez obtained high visibility in 
the mainstream media and quickly received prestigious prizes, the first one being the 
Spanish Premio Ortega y Gasset in 2008 for her activism as a citizen journalist. Her 
fame translated into transfers of material and relational resources. Sánchez, who had 
earlier participated in collective contentious projects, took the opportunity to widen the 
circles of visible contentious voices. She promoted the creation of blogs with material 
incentives (computers or spare parts given by her readers, giving prizes) and with the 
sharing of her own resources (by teaching would be bloggers the basics to launch 
their own blogs). She also used her relational resources with the mainstream media 
and famous exile blogs to give more visibility to certain causes (like state corruption or 
freedom of speech) and certain contentious groups (especially the Ladies in White and 
Omni Zona Franca). Because her blog, and later on, her tweets, were read by at least 
tens of thousands of followers and her posts constantly commented on by other bloggers 
and the mainstream media, for which she also started writing (Huffington Post, El Pais, 
Il Corriere della Sera etc.), Yoani Sánchez became an agenda-setter. This meant that 
when she tackled an issue, other people in the blogosphere then needed to comment 
on the same issue in order to become visible (the “war of visibility”, Cardon and Granjon 
13 Paideia (1988-1990) was a cultural project meant to democratize access to culture and especially to 
foreign culture and to foster more autonomy in the cultural sphere vis-à-vis the political sphere. Some 
of their members later become politicized and got involved into more political endeavors. Almost all 
of them went/were sent into exile. See special issue on Cubista Magazine, at: http://bit.ly/10GB3IV 
(last access 13/03/2013).
14 See post “Se ha dicho”, at: http://bit.ly/WaYX0y (last access 13/03/2013)
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2010). In Cuba, this was all the more so since the Cuban government had tried to 
control internet politics through gatekeeping (lack of access) before new strategies of 
control of the internet were implemented (monitoring of access). Whereas the creation 
of La Jiribilla, an online official magazine, had been a quick answer to the creation of 
the Spain-based news platform Encuentro en la Red in 2000, the Cuban government 
understood quite late the importance of individual blogs and virtual forums. The launch 
of new virtual spaces like as Cubadebate and blogs written by official journalists like 
Enrique Ubieta thus took place relatively late and attracted far fewer readers. That 
is why it became necessary for them to respond to Yoani’s stands in order to create 
their own place and readership online. Yoani Sánchez therefore became their favorite 
object of attacks.
The configuration of the emerging public arena is marked by such fights, which we 
can analyze as a continuous exchange of “coups”. Official bloggers and media indeed 
constantly attempt to delegitimize the most critical online voices by associating them 
with the “enemy”. And critical bloggers respond by delegitimizing the categories used 
to characterize them. A first example is the creation of Yohandry’s blog. It seems that a 
single “Yohandry” does not exist and that different people write on the blog. Whereas 
it is hard to know for sure, it is clear that the blog was intended as an anti-Yoani 
online space. Yohandry is indeed a typical 1970s’ name, just like Yoani. Whereas Yoani 
invited all the young Cubans whose names start with a Y to join her in her endeavor, 
Yohandry is on the contrary just as revolutionary as Yoani is critical of the revolutionary 
government. 
TV program Razones de Cuba is another example. It attacked Yoani Sánchez in 2010 
with the argument that her blog was located on a German platform and that her posts 
were translated by people all around the world. That was a clear sign – according to 
the program – that the CIA was involved in the endeavor.15 Yoani Sánchez responded 
with a long article about the “making off” of her blog. She explained that lack of steady 
access to the internet in Cuba prevented her from creating her blog on a Cuban 
platform, thus criticizing the Cuban government’s authoritarian internet politics. She 
separated physical location (the technical support of her virtual space) and symbolical 
location (where she writes from and what she writes about). The platform she shared 
with her husband is indeed called desdecuba.com (fromcuba.com). Against the vertical 
perspective of Cuban officials on her work (CIA and US government involvement) she 
explained how her readers’ interest progressively transformed into transnational and 
horizontal relationships of solidarity, which provided her with affective, logistic and 
15 See TV program on http://bit.ly/dwdk46 and more attacks on http://bit.ly/pQwuq4 and Yoani Sánchez’ 
answer at: http://bit.ly/Yb0u2Z (last access 13/03/2013).
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material support. Her post was widely commented and circulated throughout countless 
other blogs and virtual spaces. This answer did not stop attacks against her from 
Razones de Cuba. But Yoani Sánchez and her close circle of friends/bloggers launched 
their own TV program (only accessible on the internet): Razones Ciudadanas, the 
name of which is a clear reference to the official TV program, so as to oppose the 
reasons from above – from “Cuba” (since the political leadership refers to the socialist 
government as such: any critic against it is always presented as a critic against “Cuba”) 
– to the reasons from below: citizens’ voices. 
We can here clearly follow the exchange of “coups” and “contre-coups”, which 
characterizes the process of configuration of the transnational Cuban public arena. 
This exchange of “coups” is of course relevant to describe as such, but it is even more 
when analyzed as a configuration of interdependent relationships among the involved 
actors. Indeed when official blogger Ubieta argues with Yoani Sánchez he recognizes 
her – even indirectly – as a legitimate protagonist of a debate. And when Yoani Sánchez 
responds to Ubieta’s attacks, thus taking those attacks seriously enough not to ignore 
them, she also recognizes the blogger who writes them as a legitimate partner in the 
debate. The same happens when the contentious leftist project Observatorio Crítico 
comments on the plans of more liberal bloggers for Cuba’s future, they also take these 
plans as a legitimate object of discussion, though they seldom mention Yoani Sánchez 
and her fellow bloggers, because they do not want to be associated with them. 
Whereas protagonists of each micro arena were formerly almost only talking to each 
other, protagonists of the transnational Cuban public arena are now addressing 
larger audiences (although those audiences are still restricted to mostly young, urban 
and highly educated with access to NICTs), recognizing one another as legitimate 
opponents and eventually playing the same game. That is why I use here the notion of 
“configuration” (Elias 1991) to understand the process of constitution of the transnational 
Cuban public arena. It allows me to show that a game was progressively put into place 
by diverse protagonists with divergent ideologies. The game exists because all actors 
are playing the game, because they all find an interest in playing it in order to gain 
visibility, conquer new publics and win the battle of influence on the Cuban state.
Although I focus here more on the growth of contentious voices online and on the weight 
of the interactive process of constitution of virtual spaces of debate, “real” mobilizations 
and contentious actions should not thereby be underestimated in the determinants 
of the configuration of the transnational Cuban public arena. They provided indeed 
the necessary elements to be commented upon in virtual spaces and they provided 
the necessary links with previously existing contentious endeavors. Next, I will show 
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how both real and virtual dynamics have led to the creation of a transnational Cuban 
contentious space which is distinct from the public arena.
4. Towards a Transnational Cuban Contentious Space?
What is a contentious space? The notion of “space of social movements” (Mathieu 
2007a: 133) is defined as “a universe of meanings and practices, which is relatively 
autonomous within society, and in which mobilizations are linked by relations of 
interdependency”. The notion is useful to understand the growing differentiation of 
social spaces within society, and in this particular case, the fact that the “space of 
social movements” is distinct from the political field. The use of that notion seemed 
inappropriate in Cuba until recently, since Cuban society could not be categorized 
(depending on the theoretical school) as a differentiated society, i.e. as a society in which 
different autonomous fields (Bourdieu 2000) or social sectors (Dobry 1986) or systems 
(Luhmann 1982) – I will use Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of fields – something defined by the 
interaction of internal logics and self-referentiality and ensuing production/reproduction 
of the fluid equilibriums which make up a society. The process of autonomization of 
several spheres (especially the economic and cultural spheres, see Fernandes 2006; 
Geoffray 2012), which progressively transform into emergent fields, persuades me 
that the notion of “space”, understood that way, now makes sense to best describe the 
evolution of the Cuban society.
The notion of “space of social movements” is as such only of limited use in understanding 
contentious dynamics in contemporary Cuba. It is more relevant to apply the concept of 
“protest space” as proposed by Frédéric Vairel (2005) in another authoritarian context, 
that of Morocco. I here propose to name the process of convergence of the micro arenas 
described above, which I analyze as an emerging configuration of interdependency, 
a transnational Cuban contentious space. I use the notion of contention rather 
than that of protest because there are still very few street mobilizations, strikes or 
demonstrations in Cuba the way we know them in more pluralistic contexts or even in 
certain authoritarian contexts like Morocco, where they are often tolerated. The appeal 
of that notion here is that it helps us describe and analyze the growing interconnections 
between micro arenas, the growing self referentiality of individuals and collectives 
and the interdependencies between their political positions (their relationships of 
cooperation as much as of competition with one another) and the growing delimitation 
of frontiers of that space, by its protagonists themselves. I will analyze the configuration 
of that space through discourses, practices and strategies.
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4.1. Converging Norms of Expression
It is striking to observe, in the last two to three years, how segmentation logics between 
the different groups of contentious protagonists in Cuba and abroad have been 
subverted. This new dynamic is linked to the fact that these social actors no longer 
accept the political dichotomy imposed by the Cuban government (between those who 
are “with Cuba”: “good revolutionaries”, and those who are “against Cuba”: “traitors 
and mercenaries”) as legitimate. They have become open to all forms of contention 
and interested in the plurality of that contention.
We therefore need to look at the way contentious individuals and collectives refer 
to themselves and to their practices. Differences and oppositions were previously 
organized around divisions like being a “revolutionary or a “counter revolutionary”, 
being a “militant” or a “dissident”, and being a “patriot” or a “mercenary”. Counter 
revolutionaries, dissidents or mercenaries were often called as such when they voiced 
any political dissent and when they had relationships with people abroad (with similar 
political opinions). Since all contentious groups now maintain transnational connections 
with similar groups abroad, perceptions of relations with foreign individuals and groups 
have changed. They thus strive to make it commonplace by stressing the fact that 
it is extremely undemocratic for the Cuban government to prevent its citizens from 
exchanging ideas, sources of information, arguments, etc. with foreign individuals or 
collectives (from below), whereas authorized organizations can do so (from above). 
Moreover, people’s perceptions of political dissidents have changed. The Ladies in 
White have, to a large extent, contributed to this change in perceptions. First, their 
struggle has often been seen as legitimate since it was led by women and apparently 
non-political and non-violent. Secondly, when that struggle was not seen as legitimate 
(because some still thought that their husbands deserved to be imprisoned), the fact 
that they were often violently repressed, sometimes by men, was found to be ugly by 
all contentious groups. And thirdly, increased repression against individuals who have 
become targets for state officials, generally because they have started to associate 
with bloggers like Yoani Sánchez, have led them to reconsider their interpretation of 
the dissident movement. Orlando Luis Pardo is a good case in point. As a poet, Pardo 
used to refuse to interpret his critical art as political and did not want to be associated 
with political dissidents.16 A few years later, after he became a blogger and a close 
16 Notes from a meeting about the future orientation of newly-emerging contentious network “Voltus V”, 
August 2007. Some present clearly stated that although politics was not the main purpose of that 
network, their practices of contention were political. Orlando was one of the few who opposed that 
interpretation of their practices.
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friend of Yoani Sánchez, Orlando stated in an interview17 that he had understood how 
manipulative the Cuban government was. His argument was the following. He said that 
dissidents were constantly accused of being paid to criticize the government and thus 
to be only interested in money and not in real values and ideas. Since he had been 
accused of the same and since he knew that that was not true, he concluded that it 
was also probably untrue for dissidents. I am less interested here in whether dissidents 
were actually are paid or not. What interests me is the fact that people have changed 
their minds about the dissident movement after being stigmatized the same way that 
dissidents have always been stigmatized. 
This change in perceptions has had relevant consequences for this study. On the 
one hand, projects and collectives stigmatized by the government as “dissidents” or 
“mercenaries” have become objects of attention for other contentious groups, whereas 
they did not use to be discussed before. On the contrary, many collectives had built 
an image of dissidents as “enemies”, from which it was both strategic and safe to 
distinguish themselves, and in order to guarantee the continuity of their actions. But 
collectives did not only start to discuss those stigmatized individuals and groups’ work, 
they also started to use the notion of “dissent” to characterize their own position. During 
a meeting of Havana Times bloggers in November 2011 I was surprised to hear one of 
them, who was still at the time a UJC (Communist Youth) activist, declare that “in the 
end we all are dissidents”. Given the disapproving grunts that her statement provoked, 
she corrected herself and said that what she wanted to say is that “everybody somehow 
dissents and it is ok to do so”. Some started to argue that to talk about “dissidents” 
was complicated anyway, since Yoani Sánchez was for instance stigmatized as such 
by officials whereas she did not identify herself with the term. And they all referred to 
a text written by Alexis Jardines,18 a Cuban philosophy teacher who had emigrated to 
Puerto Rico, who analyzed all contentious initiatives in Cuba as a “new dissidence”. 
Although not everybody agreed on which term to use, it is relevant to underline that 
they had all read Jardines’ text as well as other texts, meaning they were all actively 
interested in knowing more about the multiplying contentious endeavors, and about 
how those endeavors are understood, perceived and analyzed by fellow Cubans both 
in Cuba and in the diaspora.
Although some of this might seem quite banal to specialists of social movements in 
more pluralistic contexts, the simple fact that contentious collectives start discussing all 
contentious projects, and not just those which are safe to discuss, does indicate that a 
17 Interview with Orlando Luis Pardo November 20, 2011
18 Alexis Jardines, “Hacia una resistencia inteligente”, published on Penúltimos Días on August 30, 
2011, at : http://bit.ly/ZzVuVG (last access 13/03/2013).
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major change is underway. They are switching from micro self-referentiality (linked only 
to their own micro arena) to a much larger self-referentiality, which now encompasses 
the whole spectrum of contention, from veiled criticism to open political dissent, from 
contention taking place in Cuba to contention organized abroad. This also means that 
contentious collectives have started to accept the legitimacy of positions which are not 
their own, and thus to link the strength of the contentious space with its plurality. To 
put it in a nutshell, there is now a “zone of mutual evaluation” (Mathieu 2007a: 135) 
between the different groups and poles of the contentious space. 
4.2. Strategies of Cooperation and Competition
This widened self-referentiality is not exempt from ambiguities, alliances and modes 
of distinction. Political positions, choices as far as practices of contention, perceptions 
of transnational fame and envy weigh on relationships of cooperation and competition 
within the emerging contentious space. The description of forms of solidarity (or the 
lack of solidarity) towards the segments of the space which are specifically targeted 
and repressed by state officials is meaningful to understand those logics of cooperation 
and competition, because they tell us about the ways collectives try to manage their 
public identity.
When Yoani Sánchez and Orlando Luis Pardo were severely beaten after they attempted 
to join a street march co-organized by performance collectives Omni Zona Franca 
and Demongeles in November 2009, not all groups and collectives from the emerging 
contentious space showed solidarity with them. One text was especially commented 
upon by Yoani Sánchez herself, because although it described a number of forms of 
repression which had struck contentious collective since a few months earlier, her case 
was not clearly mentioned.19 
The text, written by the collective Observatorio Crítico, constituted a landmark at 
the time. The protagonists of the collective indeed read the text aloud at the end of 
a workshop organized at a research institute (a space which I consider part of the 
critical arena). They also circulated it widely by email and posted it on their blog. It 
was the first time that such a text was publicized in such a way. Moreover, it was also 
the first time that a text written by a group of young activists who define themselves 
as revolutionaries took the risk to clearly oppose “official institutions” and “cultural 
projects”, to compare logics of repression in “capitalism” and in “socialism” and to 
criticize the way some people were stigmatized as “counter revolutionaries” with no 
19 See the text published on the Observatorio Crítico’s website on December 18, 2009, at: 
http://bit.ly/10GDVpc (last access 13/03/2013).
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reason. Finally, it was also the first time that many different social, cultural and political 
endeavors were mentioned in one single text, as part of the same process of creative 
criticism, and defended together against arbitrariness. By appealing to their rights, they 
transcended conflicts and individual positions and created a “public standard”, i.e. a 
basis to negotiate those rights (Hanna Pitkin 1981). With this text, they constructed 
divisions between “above” and “below”, between “bureaucracy” and “autonomous” 
initiatives, thus showing a form of solidarity with all contentious arenas.
But this text was also written with a style which still borrowed from the specific socialist 
language of euphemisms. The title of the text is a clear example of that. It is entitled: 
“Letter of Rejection of Current Obstructions and Prohibitions of Social and Cultural 
Initiatives”. It is not entitled: “Letter against Censorship and Repression”. Yoani 
Sánchez and Orlando Luis Pardo’s case is described as a case of “obstructions, arrests 
and impediments” linked to the organized march, not as a case of brutal repression, 
including physical violence and kidnapping. This is the reason why Yoani Sánchez 
answered dryly that members of the Observatorio Crítico were not able to position 
themselves clearly enough vis-à-vis the government. Rather than “official institutions” 
and “cultural initiatives”, she opposed a “small circle of power” (made of Raúl Castro 
and his followers) with the rest of the Cuban society. She thus contested their definition 
of the existing divide between “above” and “below”. The same happened again with 
another text promoted by Cuban émigré Ariel Hidalgo, but obviously inspired by 
members of the Observatorio Crítico.20 In that case, blogger Miriam Celaya answered 
bluntly in order to criticize their strategic way of selecting cases of censorship and 
repression. 
In fact, Observatorio Crítico does consist of a network of different cultural, intellectual 
and ecological projects with a leftist political position, and its members do not want to 
be associated with any liberal project of any kind. When I asked some of its members in 
November 2011 why they never went to Estado de Sats’ debates, they answered that 
they refused to participate in a space of debate known to be politically liberal. Some 
also admitted that they feared that they would be associated with some stigmatized 
contentious personalities such as Yoani Sánchez and Antonio Rodiles (the founder of 
Estado de Sats). This strategy is resented by more liberal contentious voices, especially 
bloggers like Yoani Sánchez, who criticize this revolutionary ethos as irresponsible, 
because it does not allow contentious voices, whatever their differences, to converge 
in a collective effort to push together for regime change.
20 “Appeal against censorship in Cuba”, published March 4, 2011 on Armando Chaguaceda’s diary in 
Havana Times, at: http://bit.ly/w0MChS (last access 13/03/2013).
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It is clear that logics of horizontal solidarity (between contentious groups) do not always 
prevail over vertical logics of repression but this does not invalidate my argument that 
this social space is in the making. On the contrary, it shows that the poles within that 
space are becoming visible, interactive and interdependent (Mathieu 2007a) since 
they keep referring themselves to one another through praise, attacks or comments, 
positioning themselves in relation to others’ positions, and developing their own logics, 
interests and characteristics.
4.3. Delimiting the New Contentious Space
My last argument addresses how a social space starts to exist when people try to delimit 
its frontiers. It thus becomes territorialized (Ripoll and Veschambre 2005). In the case 
I am interested in, there are at present constant struggles to define people’s legitimacy 
to voice criticism of the Cuban government. Some protagonists intend to open up 
the space as much as possible, while others, on the contrary, try to restrict entrance. 
While that game is going on, some frontiers are being delimited. Although they remain 
blurred and constantly moving, a few elements do create distinctions between what I 
call the transnational Cuban contentious space and other social and political spaces.
Interestingly enough for this paper, whose ambition is to show the intertwined links 
between local and transnational dynamics, the first text which had an impact as far 
as the delimitation of the new contentious space was written by US diplomats at the 
United States Interests Section in Havana. A secret cable on the matter, published by 
Wikileaks, was widely commented upon both in the mainstream international press21 
and on blogs. It stated bluntly that the US should now bet more on younger contentious 
voices than on “old dissidents” to push for regime change. The cable distinguished 
between the old and the young, the obsolete and the innovative, and between those 
who remained little visible whereas others managed to attract massive attention. Since 
this vision was imposed from external actors, we could have expected “old dissidents” 
to challenge it. On the contrary, many endorsed it, therefore enforcing this framing 
further, in order to defend their own legitimacy vis-à-vis the new voices. They accused 
the new contentious voices to be a “light” dissidence and to be thus objective allies of 
the Cuban government.22 Some of those new dissenting protagonists then counter-
attacked with the following argument: “old dissidents” were those whose actions 
21 “EEUU apuesta por la disidencia juvenil”, in: El País, December 16, 2010: http://bit.ly/Z2czK9 (last 
access 13/03/2013).
22 See those two texts, written a few months after the US cables were made public. Darsi Ferrer, “Los 
blogueros alternativos, un mal menor para los Castro”, Encuentro en la Red, April 12, 2011, at: 
http://bit.ly/ZmPXTN (last access 13/03/2013), and Marta Beatríz Roque, “Fábrica de disidentes”, 
Diario de Cuba, August 4, 2011, accessible at: http://bit.ly/Y1g0Ce (last access 13/03/2013). 
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actually echoed those of the government, since they used the same language and 
the same practices of exclusion and stigmatization.23 Thus far, the division was clearly 
along generational lines. 
This division was soon reconsidered by scholar Alexis Jardines.24 While Jardines also 
opposed a “new” and an “old dissidence”, generation was not used as a dividing line. 
The ladies in white were indeed classified as part of the “new dissidence”, whereas 
they fought for the liberation of their husbands and sons, who were members of the “old 
dissidence” (mostly dissident party members or independent journalists). In Jardines’ 
perspectives, modes of action rather than identities (generational or sociopolitical 
identities) distinguished between new and old dissidence: diversity versus unity, 
openness and publicity versus conspiracy and secrecy, the mingling of art with activism 
versus dry confrontational politics. In that perspective, the “old dissidence” becomes 
an “opposition” movement, to insist on their focus on power politics, whereas the new 
contentious voices become the “dissidence”. Two elements need to be underlined here. 
The first one is that this second attempt at delimiting the borders of the new contentious 
space is made from outside Cuba, by a transnational actor (an exile intellectual who 
maintains strong connections with the cultural and intellectual spheres in Cuba). The 
second one is that it is precisely because this text was written by an outsider (not a 
member of any contentious group) that it had a strong impact as far as the framing of 
the new contentious space: it was widely circulated (since it was published on famous 
exile blog Penúltimos Días ) and it was seen as relatively unbiased.
Those framings of the frontiers of the new contentious space had not, however, been 
discussed among the more left oriented social circles within that space (mainly Havana 
Times bloggers and Observatorio Crítico) until they read Jardines’ text. They indeed 
considered that they did not belong to the same space as many bloggers, older human 
rights activists or the Ladies in White, since they were at the opposite end of the political 
spectrum. They rather referred to studies done by a neomarxist exile intellectual (Haroldo 
Dilla) who analyzed the contentious spaces in Cuba according to their political stands: 
“liberal” spaces on the one side and neomarxist or libertarian spaces on the other side. 
Jardines’ text was the first one to bridge the gap between both sides, by emphasizing 
modes of action rather than political positions. He stressed the groups’ converging 
perspective on politics (politics from below), rather than what made them differ. The 
text triggered heated debates among members of the Observatorio Crítico (some of 
23 Antonio Rodiles, “Espejismo y realidad. Una respuesta a Marta Beatríz Roque”, Diario de Cuba, 
August 5, 2011, http://bit.ly/qscRzC (last access 13/03/2013); Ailer Gonzalez, “Fábrica de alas”, at: 
http://bit.ly/YtuzLf (last access 13/03/2013).
24 Alexis Jardines, “Hacia una resistencia inteligente”, Penúltimos Días, August 30, 2011, at: 
http://bit.ly/149E753 (last access 21/03/2013).
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which I could attend during my stay in November 2011) which led to an opening of the 
network towards other contentious endeavors. Although most protagonists still strove 
to maintain their own framing of the emerging contentious space – in terms of political 
orientation – they did agree that they shared some characteristics with other groups, 
despite their differing political opinions. All agreed, for instance, that the particularly 
violent repression wielded against the Ladies in White was wrong. This is significant 
because for the first time elements of convergence (their fight against censorship and 
repression) emerged, while they had long been discarded in order to preserve the 
group’s political cohesion. It is also interesting to underline that those debates enabled 
the bridging of the gap between the protagonists’ curiosity and their fear. Some of them 
indeed started to attend some meetings and activities of the more “liberal” spaces 
(which they had never done before), thus creating further contacts, exchanges and 
possibilities for convergence between those spaces.
Although the contours of the emerging contentious space remain ill defined, we can 
observe clear dynamics of interaction between different contentious arenas, which 
used to be quite segmented and marginal. Those interactions have led to the creation 
of a common space where meanings and practices of contention are shared, debated 
upon and constantly defined and redefined. It therefore is relevant to analyze that 
space as a specific “contentious space”. Although discourses, practices and strategies 
may vary within that space and thus contribute to debates about its frontiers, one 
characteristic clearly distinguished this space from the political field : its protagonists 
are not – at least apparently – professional protagonists of that field. They do not 
have political programs and they do not intend to compete for political positions. At 
the same time, their position might be more ambiguous than that of protagonists of 
social movements elsewhere because autonomy is still a challenge for every social 
sector in Cuba today, including for the political sector which is still entirely controlled 
by the highest ranking civil servants of the present Cuban government. A second 
characteristic also distinguishes that new social space from other dynamics, especially 
from dynamics of resistance as they are often called by researchers. Visibility and 
collectivity have indeed become criteria for belonging to the contentious space. They 
are necessary in order to be commented upon, thus to become legitimate, especially 
among the diaspora protagonists of the contentious space. Invisible (below the radar) 
and individual modes of resistance become segmented from that space, because they 
do not exist publicly if they are not acknowledged as clearly contentious and claimed 
as such. 
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5. Conclusion
The objective of the paper was to understand how contentious voices have managed to 
bridge inequalities of access to spaces of public debates while creating and enlarging the 
reduced and fragile public sphere that had started to exist when NTICs were liberalized 
recently in Cuba. Through an extensive empirical analysis, I have demonstrated how 
precarious horizontal dynamics of interaction have turned into a living web of intricate 
interpersonal and collective communication, debate and exchange, which led to 
campaigns and direct actions, thanks to critical uses of the internet. These virtual and 
real activities have played a crucial role for the convergence of micro arenas that used 
to be segmented from one another because they have changed people’s perceptions 
of visibility, pushing contentious protagonists to expose themselves online, and thus 
have enabled more interaction between them.
These heightened interactions have led the contentious protagonists to recognize one 
another as legitimate opponents; that is, as players in the same game. It is indeed the 
emergence of a more plural and connected public arena which has made it easier to 
identify potential enemies and potential allies. Here it is important to note that allies 
are not always politically aligned. Although political positions of course matter, what 
actually mattered more to lead to the constitution of a transnational contentious space 
was a common goal: to contribute to social and political change within Cuba, from 
below. This common goal, which is understood strategically by most protagonists, has 
in turn allowed them to unite forces to gain visibility, conquer new publics and wage a 
battle of influence over Cuban politics, despite diverging ideologies.
This approach also illuminates how those dynamics of convergence between different 
social arenas have contributed to create a specific space of contention which has 
gained autonomy from both the political sphere and the cultural sphere. That space 
is interesting to study as such, to understand the possibilities of protest under an 
authoritarian government. It is for instance clear that those possibilities are rather 
restrained, often to urban and highly educated people in the capital city: in the Cuban 
case, inequalities between Havana and the rest of the island are clearly visible and 
they will certainly keep growing during the next years. I did not study those dynamics 
thoroughly in that paper because it was first necessary to understand to what extent 
the emergence of a somewhat autonomous transnational contentious space was 
changing the way power was wielded in Cuba.
This paper has analyzed one element of the process of complexification of the Cuban 
society: the emerging transnational contentious space. Indeed the emergence of that 
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space is linked to the process of differentiation of fields (in the sense of Bourdieu) within 
Cuban society. Since the 1990s, the economic and cultural fields have undergone 
reforms, which have allowed their protagonists to obtain more autonomy vis-à-vis 
the political field and thus to organize according to their own professional interests 
(to a certain extent). Such processes are also at work within other social sectors of 
the Cuban society, specifically in the media and in the sphere of law. To understand 
the contemporary evolution of the Cuban society, it would therefore be necessary to 
conduct a broader analysis of that process in cooperation with specialists of economics, 
politics, contention, the legal and judicial system, etc. 
As for now, I chose to focus on the emergence of a new social space, a transnational 
space of contention, because it crucial to analyze it in order to understand how certain 
issues now become partly public, and therefore discussed by some segments of the 
Cuban society in Cuba as well as in the diaspora. It is a crucial social space because 
it is situated at the margins of the political field and constitutes a space where conflicts 
are staged, concerns and claims are raised, issues are discussed and eventually the 
future of Cuba is being debated. That is why it will be important for future research to 
bear in mind that this space is mostly shaped by young, urban and highly educated 
protagonists from Havana, while poorer and rural uneducated Cuban citizens have 
very few possibilities to join the process. At the same time that the Cuban government’s 
power is being contested, new social and economic hierarchies are clearly being 
established. They will probably make Cuba look more and more like many other Latin 
American countries over the next five to ten years.
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